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INTRODUCTION 
One of the earliest investigations into a sitting president began in 
1796. The House of Representatives demanded documents from 
President George Washington as part of its investigation into a treaty 
he had negotiated with Great Britain.1 Washington refused to comply, 
resting his argument on a doctrine now known as Executive Privilege—
the concept that private communications between a president and his 
advisors should remain confidential so that the president may exercise 
the full powers of the office uninhibited.2 Since Washington’s refusal, a 
number of presidents have been dogged by other kinds of 
investigations—for conduct official or private, for matters criminal or 
civil. But no president has been subject to investigation like Donald 
Trump. 
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 1.  George Washington, Message to the House Regarding Documents Relative to the Jay 
Treaty, Mar. 30, 1796, https://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/gw003.asp. In one of the earliest 
invocations of privilege over U.S. government documents, President Washington responded to a 
House request for his written negotiation instructions given to Secretary of State John Jay, who 
held a series of meetings with British diplomats to draft a treaty on Washington’s behalf. See 
generally id. The House was considering repealing the treaty and wanted the negotiation 
instructions to determine whether the negotiation was flawed. Washington refused to turn over 
the documents, citing the secretive “nature of foreign negotiation” and the lack of any 
constitutional purpose for the House to demand them—highlighting that it had not passed a 
resolution mentioning impeachment. Id. Washington’s refusal laid the foundation for the 
Executive Privilege. 
 2.  Id. 
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Federal law enforcement, Congress, and State prosecutors in New 
York all conducted investigations of Trump during his presidency. Even 
this list is not exhaustive: it excludes two impeachment proceedings—
one for abuse of power and obstruction of Congress and the second for 
inciting insurrection—as well as a number of civil lawsuits against 
Trump in his personal capacity.3 The scale of investigation was 
unprecedented. Yet it is President Trump’s unique strategy to opposing 
investigations that renders his treatment of investigations remarkable. 
Two predecessors, Presidents Nixon and Clinton, were faced with 
similar investigative perils, but responded in far less dramatic fashion. 
Nixon moved to quash a subpoena for his Oval Office tapes on the 
grounds that they were shielded by Executive Privilege. Clinton 
accepted the validity of a number of subpoenas but objected to a civil 
lawsuit by claiming he was constitutionally immune to such 
proceedings while president. Both Nixon and Clinton pursued their 
arguments at the Supreme Court; both lost. 
President Trump did not file straightforward motions to quash 
grand jury subpoenas, nor did he narrowly accommodate requests from 
investigators. Instead, he argued that he was completely exempt from 
complying with all demands for information—including demands by 
state prosecutors and Congress. In both logic and spirit, these 
arguments contradicted the holdings of United States v. Nixon,4 which 
held that neither Executive Privilege nor presidential status render 
grand jury subpoenas unenforceable, and Clinton v. Jones, which held 
that presidents are not absolutely immune from judicial proceedings 
while in office.5 
Trump escaped the long shadows of Nixon and Jones in part 
because of defects in our legal system that demand our attention. First, 
Special Counsel regulations—a hastily developed replacement for 
independent prosecutor statutes—are gravely defective and foster 
unnecessary secrecy and confusion. Second, courts’ deference to 
presidents appearing in personal capacities allowed Trump to pursue 
brazen and unfounded constitutional claims. Finally, a lack of legal 
 
 3.  See, e.g., Trump v. Carroll, 52 N.Y.S.3d 330, 333 (S.D.N.Y. 2020) (addressing a civil 
lawsuit for against Trump for sexual assault); D.C. v. Trump, 291 F. Supp. 3d 725, 733 (D.C. Md. 
2018) (addressing emoluments clause lawsuits against Trump for his private businesses); Jacobus 
v. Trump, 51 N.Y.S.3d 330, 333 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2017) (addressing a civil lawsuit against Trump and 
noting that “Trump was at all relevant times a candidate” and not sitting president for the 
purposes of the litigation). 
 4.  418 U.S. 683, 706 (1974).  
 5.  520 U.S. 681, 705–06 (1997).  
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clarity about Congressional subpoenas allowed Trump to stonewall a 
co-equal branch of government. The result was something neither 
Clinton nor Nixon accomplished: concealment of relevant evidence 
until Trump’s term had ended. 
Part I examines various investigations into President Trump. Part II 
reviews the respective legal approaches Presidents Nixon, Clinton, and 
Trump enlisted to counter presidential subpoenas in courts of law. Part 
III explores more deeply the problems that allowed Trump’s delay 
tactics and temporary evasion of lawful subpoenas. It goes on to 
recommend policy solutions that would prevent future presidents from 
invoking similarly unpersuasive arguments. Unless reforms are 
implemented, it will be left to the same judicial process to remind the 
next iteration of President Trump that he or she is not king—a truth so 
fundamental to our constitutional system it should go without saying 
more than two centuries into the American experiment.6 
I.  A PRESIDENT UNDER SIEGE 
During Trump’s 2016 presidential campaign, a series of contacts 
between Trump Campaign officials and individuals connected to 
Russian government intelligence agencies sparked an FBI 
investigation.7 After Trump’s win, U.S. intelligence agencies recorded 
Michael Flynn, then President-Elect Trump’s named National Security 
Advisor, speaking with the Russian Ambassador Sergei Kislyak.8 In 
that conversation, Flynn implicitly promised to lift sanctions on Russia 
that were imposed by President Obama in response to Russia’s 
interference in the 2016 election.9 The conversation raised the specter 
of prosecution under the Logan Act, a criminal statute prohibiting 
private citizens from conducting foreign policy.10 
 
 6.  Comm. on the Judiciary v. McGahn, 415 F. Supp. 3d 148, 213 (D.D.C. 2019) (pointing 
out that the “primary takeaway from the past 250 years of recorded American history is that 
Presidents are not kings”). 
 7.  1 ROBERT S. MUELLER, III, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, REPORT ON THE INVESTIGATION 
INTO RUSSIAN INTERFERENCE IN THE 2016 ELECTION 80–81 (2019) [hereinafter Mueller Report 
Vol. I].  
 8.  Evan Perez & Jim Sciutto, US Investigating Flynn Calls with Russian Diplomat, CNN 
(Jan. 23, 2017), https://www.cnn.com/2017/01/23/politics/flynn-russia-calls-
investigation/index.html. 
 9.  Letter from Dir. of Nat’l Intelligence, to Sens. Grassley and Johnson (May 29, 2020), 
https://www.grassley.senate.gov/odni-grassley-johnson-flynn-transcripts.  
 10.  Clare Foran, What Is the Logan Act and What Does It Have to Do With Flynn?, THE 
ATLANTIC (Feb. 15, 2017), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2017/02/logan-act-
michael-flynn-trump-russia/516774/. 
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The FBI was also aware of a series of private reports collected by 
Trump’s opponents regarding his relationship with Russia.11 The 
reports cited Russian sources and sub-sources and included a number 
of unverified allegations: namely, that Trump knew of Russia’s election 
interference operation, that Russia financially supported Trump, that 
Russian banks financed election interference, and that Russia 
possessed videos depicting Trump in compromising positions.12 Those 
reports and news of Flynn’s calls to the Ambassador were leaked to the 
public as Trump assumed office.13 Eventually, the controversy forced 
Flynn to resign.14 Trump repeatedly demanded that FBI Director James 
Comey drop any further investigation and asked that he publicly 
declare that Trump was not under investigation with regard to Russia.15 
The Director refused,16 and eventually, Trump fired him.17 What ensued 
was a series of investigations: several by federal law enforcement, 
others by Congress, and a criminal investigation by New York State 
prosecutors. 
A.  The “Feds” 
Federal investigations, though not legally challenged by President 
Trump, informed probes by Congress and the Manhattan D.A.’s office, 
both of which Trump ultimately challenged.18 These investigations 
began with the firing of FBI Director Comey: Trump ordered Deputy 
Attorney General Rod Rosenstein to draft a letter announcing 
Comey’s dismissal and to include in that letter a comment that the 
 
 11.  Statement for the R. from James Comey, to Senate Select Comm. on Intelligence (Jun. 
8, 2017). 
 12.  Ken Bensinger, Miriam Elder, & Mark Schoofs, These Reports Allege Trump Has Deep 
Ties to Russia, BUZZFEED NEWS (Jan. 10, 2017), 
https://www.buzzfeednews.com/article/kenbensinger/these-reports-allege-trump-has-deep-ties-
to-russia.  
 13.  David Ignatius, Why Did Obama Dawdle on Russia’s Hacking?, WASH. POST (Jan. 12, 
2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/why-did-obama-dawdle-on-russias-
hacking/2017/01/12/75f878a0-d90c-11e6-9a36-1d296534b31e_story.html.  
 14.  Maggie Haberman et al., Michael Flynn Resigns as National Security Advisor, N.Y. 
TIMES (Feb. 14, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/13/us/politics/donald-trump-national-
security-adviser-michael-flynn.html.  
 15.  Open Hr’g with Former FBI Director James Comey: Hr’g before the Select Comm. on 
Intelligence of the U.S. Senate, 114th Cong. 4 (2017) (statement of Sen. Mark Warner).  
 16.  Id. 
 17.  Maggie Haberman et al., ‘Enough Was Enough’: How Festering Anger at Comey Ended 
in His Firing, N.Y. TIMES (May 10, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/10/us/politics/how-
trump-decided-to-fire-james-comey.html.  
 18.  Trump v. Mazars USA, LLP, 140 S. Ct. 2019 (2020); Trump v. Vance, 140 S. Ct. 2412 
(2020). 
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Russia investigation was a hoax—which troubled Rosenstein.19 A draft 
without the Russia language was made public and Comey was removed 
from his position.20 
The next morning, Trump met with the Russian Foreign Minister 
Sergei Lavrov and said, “I just fired the head of the FBI. He was crazy, 
a real nut job. I faced great pressure because of Russia. That’s taken off 
. . . I’m not under investigation.”21 When news outlets reported these 
comments, the White House responded that Trump really meant to say 
that Comey had “created unnecessary pressure on our ability to engage 
and negotiate with Russia.”22 Shortly after, Trump gave a nationally 
televised interview during which he stated that when he decided to fire 
Comey, he was thinking, “[Y]ou know, this Russia thing with Trump and 
Russia is a made-up story. It’s an excuse by the Democrats for having 
lost an election they should’ve won.”23 In response to these events, 
Deputy Attorney General Rosenstein—on his own volition—
appointed former FBI Director Robert S. Mueller III as a Department 
of Justice Special Counsel to investigate Russian election 
interference.24 
Over the course of a two-year investigation, Mueller prosecuted 
thirty-four people, three Russian organizations, and obtained a number 
of guilty pleas and convictions.25 Early in the investigation, reporters 
from The New York Times asked Trump whether Mueller would cross 
a “red line” if he looked at Trump’s finances and his family members’ 
finances for connections to Russia.26 Trump responded, “I would say 
yes . . . . [I]t’s possible there’s a condo or something . . . and somebody 
from Russia buys a condo, who knows? I don’t make any money from 
Russia.”27 Trump continued, “No, I think that’s a violation. Look, this is 
 
 19.  See 2 ROBERT S. MUELLER, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, REPORT ON THE INVESTIGATION 
INTO RUSSIAN INTERFERENCE IN THE 2016 ELECTION 62 (2019) [hereinafter Mueller Report 
Volume II]. 
 20.  Id. 
 21.  Id. 
 22.  Id. at 71 (emphasis added). 
 23.  Id. at 73. 
 24.  Dep’t of Justice, App’t of Special Counsel to Investigate Russian Interference with the 
2016 Presidential Election and Related Matters, Order No. 3915-2017 (May. 17, 2017) 
[hereinafter Appointment Order]. 
 25.  Ashley Turner, What We Know About Special Counsel Mueller’s Russia Probe So Far, 
CNBC (Mar. 25, 2019, 3:08 PM), https://www.cnbc.com/2019/03/22/what-we-know-about-special-
counsel-muellers-russia-probe-so-far.html. 
 26.  Excerpts from the Times’s Interview with Trump, N.Y. TIMES (Jul. 19, 2017), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/07/19/us/politics/trump-interview-transcript.html.  
 27.  Id. 
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about Russia. So, I think if he wants to go, my finances are extremely 
good, my company is an unbelievably successful company . . . . But I 
have no income from Russia. I don’t do business with Russia.”28 
Mueller did not examine Trump’s personal finances, nor did he 
investigate financial crimes like bribery, tax fraud, or money laundering 
related to Trump.29 The scope of Mueller’s investigation was narrowly 
focused on election interference activity.30 But Mueller referred a 
number of cases to other investigators: For instance, after he had 
interviewed Michael Cohen, the President’s then-personal attorney 
and an executive at the Trump Organization, Mueller referred to the 
appropriate authorities in New York information about possible 
campaign finance law violations involving payments made during 
Trump’s presidential campaign to women with whom he had had 
extramarital affairs.31 But Mueller never spoke publicly once during the 
investigation, and his silence left the scope of his work largely unclear 
to outsiders. Some members of Congress expressed dismay that it 
seemed like Mueller had left many stones unturned—namely, financial 
ties between Trump and Russia.32 
Twelve other cases that Mueller referred elsewhere remain 
redacted.33 Cohen surrendered to the FBI on August 21, 2018, and pled 
guilty to eight criminal charges: five counts of tax evasion, one count of 
making false statements to a financial institution, one count of willfully 
causing an unlawful corporate contribution, and one count of making 
an excessive campaign contribution at Trump’s request.34 The press 
 
 28.  Id. 
 29.  Testimony of Robert Mueller to the House Intelligence Committee, July 24, 2019, 
https://docs.house.gov/meetings/IG/IG00/20190724/109808/HHRG-116-IG00-Transcript-
20190724.pdf.  
 30.  See Appointment Order, supra note 24.  
 31.  Dareh Gregorian, Mueller Mystery: What are the other 12 criminal referrals?, NBC NEWS 
(Apr. 18, 2019 5:55 PM), https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/donald-trump/mueller-mystery-what-
are-12-criminal-referrals-n996166.  
 32.  Jen Kirby, The Last Minutes of Mueller’s Testimony Made the Best Case for the Russia 
Investigation, VOX (Jul. 24, 2019, 4:55 PM), https://www.vox.com/policy-and-
politics/2019/7/24/20726405/mueller-testimony-russian-interference-adam-schiff.  
 33.  One case reportedly involved an investigation Mueller pursued regarding an Egyptian 
bank in relation to an alleged $10 million contribution to Trump’s 2016 campaign, but the case 
was closed after Attorney General Barr replaced the attorney overseeing the office handling the 
matter. Katelyn Polantz, Evan Perez, & Jeremy Herb, Feds Chased Suspected Foreign Link to 
Trump’s 2016 Campaign Cash for Three Years, CNN (Oct. 14, 2020, 8:59 PM), 
https://www.cnn.com/2020/10/14/politics/trump-campaign-donation-investigation/index.html.  
 34.  Press Release, Michael Cohen Pleads Guilty in Manhattan Federal Court to Eight 
Counts, Including Criminal Tax Evasion and Campaign Finance Violations, DEP’T OF JUSTICE 
(Aug. 21, 2018) (on file with author). 
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reported that federal prosecutors in New York were focused on the 
Trump Organization,35 but as of March, 2021, no such investigation has 
emerged. 
B.  Congress 
Before Cohen began serving his sentence, he testified publicly for 
more than seven hours before the House Oversight Committee about 
his work with Trump and the Trump Organization.36 He detailed 
Trump’s potential misconduct before and during his presidency: 
unlawfully reimbursing hush money payments during his presidential 
campaign, implicitly directing Cohen to lie to investigators, and filing 
false financial statements with banks and insurance companies before 
he assumed office.37 Cohen’s testimony prompted the House of 
Representatives to investigate President Trump and the Trump 
Organization. In April 2019, the House Intelligence Committee and the 
House Financial Services Committee issued subpoenas to the 
President’s accounting firm, Mazars USA, and his primary lender, 
Deutsche Bank AG, for ten years of Trump’s financial records.38 
House Committee members justified their investigations by 
emphasizing that Mueller had not pursued Trump’s foreign financial 
ties.39 President Trump immediately filed petitions to block 
Congressional subpoenas from enforcement in federal court.40 He 
 
 35.  Luppe Luppen & Hunter Walker, New York Attorney General Unveils Investigation into 
Trump Company’s Finances, YAHOO NEWS (Aug. 24, 2020), https://news.yahoo.com/new-york-
attorney-general-unveils-investigation-into-trump-companys-finances-223323626.html. Two 
sources familiar with the situation told Yahoo News that the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the 
Southern District of New York was conducting an aggressive investigation into Trump’s real 
estate business in 2019, with a specific focus on questionable practices related to the valuation of 
his properties. The New York Attorney General also alluded to the existence of a federal 
investigation in court documents. 
 36.  Testimony of Michael D. Cohen, Comm. on Oversight and Reform, U.S. House of Rep. 
116–03 (Feb. 27, 2019). 
 37.  Trump v. Mazars USA, LLP, 140 S. Ct. 2019, 2022 (2020). 
 38.  Jan Wolfe, Trump Sues to Block Congress Subpoena for His Financial Records, 
REUTERS (Apr. 22, 2019, 9:33 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-trump-
congress/trump-sues-to-block-congress-subpoena-for-his-financial-records-idUSKCN1RY0YD.  
 39.  See Kyle Cheney & Zachary Warmbrodt, Schiff Says FBI Hasn’t Probed National 
Security Risks of Trump’s Foreign Financial Ties, POLITICO (Aug. 26, 2020, 5:19 PM), 
https://www.politico.com/news/2020/08/26/adam-schiff-fbi-trump-foreign-financial-ties-402318 
(noting that despite Mueller’s refusal, the Intelligence Committee would continue to press for 
bank records).  
 40.  David Farenthold et al., Trump Sues in Bid to Block Congressional Subpoena of 
Financial Records, WASH. POST (Apr. 22, 2019), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/trump-
sues-in-bid-to-block-congressional-subpoena-of-financial-records/2019/04/22/a98de3d0-6500-
11e9-82ba-fcfeff232e8f_story.html.  
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claimed that Congress had no legitimate legislative reason to subpoena 
his financial records, was acting as law enforcement, and was using its 
subpoena power to harass the President.41 
C.  The State of New York 
Not long after Congress had issued its subpoenas to Mazars and 
Deutsche Bank, New York State investigators did the same. They issued 
a nearly identical subpoena to Trump’s accounting firm. President 
Trump moved to block that subpoena, too, arguing that “the person 
who serves as President, while in office, enjoys absolute immunity from 
criminal process of any kind.”42 
The background of the New York State investigation highlights 
some deficiencies in the Special Counsel’s probe. Early on in Mueller’s 
tenure as Special Counsel, his team traveled to New York to meet with 
state investigators in order to establish cooperation between offices.43 
Public reporting suggested that Mueller’s team was working with New 
York Attorney General Eric Schneiderman on possible money 
laundering violations, but Mueller never brought such charges.44 After 
Cohen was indicted on federal charges for the illegal hush money 
payments made during the 2016 campaign,45 many speculated that New 
York federal prosecutors were picking up cases handed off by 
Mueller.46 Although Cohen’s federal indictment stated that he had 
committed crimes “at the direction of” Donald Trump, no further 
federal investigation of Trump materialized in New York.47 But then, a 
year after Mueller had completed his report, the Manhattan District 
Attorney subpoenaed the Trump Organization for its corporate 
 
 41.  See Wolfe, supra note 38.  
 42.  Trump v. Vance, 395 F. Supp. 3d 283, 288 (S.D.N.Y. 2019). 
 43.  Josh Dawsey, Mueller Teams Up with New York Attorney General in Manafort Probe, 
POLITICO (Aug. 30, 2017, 7:26 PM), https://www.politico.com/story/2017/08/30/manafort-mueller-
probe-attorney-general-242191.  
 44.  Id. 
 45.  Ben Protess & William K. Raushbaum, Manhattan D.A. Subpoenas Trump 
Organization Over Stormy Daniels Hush Money Payments, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 1, 2019), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/08/01/nyregion/trump-cohen-stormy-daniels-vance.html.  
 46.  Christina Wilkie, Mueller Referred Evidence of 14 Other Potential Crimes to Federal 
Officials. Only Two of Them are Publicly Known, CNBC (Apr. 18, 2019), 
https://www.cnbc.com/2019/04/18/mueller-evidence-14-potential-crimes-only-two-publicly-
known.html.  
 47.  Darren Samuelsohn, Feds’ Probe into Trump Hush Money Payments is Over, Judge 
Says, POLITICO (Jul. 17, 2019), https://www.politico.com/story/2019/07/17/trump-hush-money-
payments-probe-over-1418074.  
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records,48 launching a state criminal investigation of the President. 
The D.A. was examining whether senior executives at the Trump 
Organization had falsified business records about the hush money 
payments, which may have violated state criminal law.49 When it 
emerged that the D.A. had also sent a grand jury subpoena to Trump’s 
accounting firm, Mazars, for tax records dating back to 2011, it became 
clear that the investigation was broader than originally reported.50 
Later filings indicated that the investigation involved fraud and that the 
grand jury was investigating a “protracted period of criminal conduct” 
at President Trump’s business.51 The New York Times reported that 
Trump’s primary lender, Deutsche Bank, had already complied with 
subpoenas a year earlier.52 Faced with two probes into his finances, 
Trump attempted to block the New York investigation too, employing 
expansive constitutional claims that bore closer resemblance to the 
rights of a king than a president.53 
II. A NOVEL DISREGARD FOR THE LAW 
Although it is true that almost every modern president has been 
investigated,54 there are only two presidents who were investigated in a 
manner remotely close to the investigations described above: Richard 
Nixon and Bill Clinton. Both took different approaches to resisting 
investigators—and both lost. Examining their failed arguments 
demonstrates that President Trump’s attempts to block investigators 
were remarkably unmoored from both political and legal precedent. 
 
 48.  Protess & Raushbaum, supra note 45. 
 49.  Id. 
 50.  Tom Winter & Hallie Jackson, Manhattan DA Subpoenas Trump’s Tax Returns in Probe 
of Hush Money Payments, NBC NEWS (Sept. 16, 2019), 
https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/donald-trump/manhattan-da-subpoenas-trump-s-tax-returns-
probe-hush-money-n1055046.  
 51.  William K. Rashbaum & Benjamin Weiser, D.A. Is Investigating Trump and His 
Company Over Fraud, Filing Suggests, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 3, 2020), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/08/03/nyregion/donald-trump-taxes-cyrus-vance.html.  
 52.  David Enrich et al., Trump’s Bank Was Subpoenaed by N.Y. Prosecutors in Criminal 
Inquiry, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 5, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/08/05/nyregion/trump-taxes-
vance-deutsche-bank.html.  
 53.  In Mazars, the Court held that President Trump’ constitutional claims would “seriously 
risk impeding Congress in carrying out its responsibilities,” did not distinguish between privileged 
and nonprivileged information, or official and personal information, and represented a 
“significant departure from the longstanding way of doing business between the branches [of 
government].” Trump v. Mazars USA, LLP, 140 S. Ct. 2019, 2023 (2020). 
 54.  Sonam Sheth, Obama is the only president since Nixon who didn’t face an independent 
investigation, BUS. INSIDER (Oct. 23, 2017), https://www.businessinsider.com/obama-nixon-
trump-russia-independent-investigation-2017-10.  
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Trump went further than either comparable predecessor: He rebuffed 
demands for information about his finances, claimed a “total 
immunity” that appeared internally illogical and inconsistent with 
precedent, and avoided filing proper claims in order to delay 
transmission of evidence until after the 2020 election. While he did not 
prevail in court, Trump succeeded in concealing evidence about his 
finances during his presidency, something that Nixon and Clinton both 
failed to do. 
A.  President Nixon’s Approach 
President Nixon faced a perilous criminal investigation, which also 
ensnared his closest associates, but his efforts to counter investigators 
were the most straightforward of the three presidents examined in this 
Note. First, Nixon asserted Executive Privilege, a legal principle 
recognized in American law. Second, the Supreme Court expedited the 
process of hearing the appeal on Nixon’s motion to quash the subpoena 
due to its regard of the public importance of the matter. Third, Nixon’s 
limited cooperation with prosecutors allowed them to file a narrow 
subpoena. Fourth, Nixon filed a straightforward motion to quash 
instead of invoking some form of absolute immunity associated with 
the presidential office. Finally, Nixon’s claim of privilege covered 
official conduct, not personal conduct. In later sections, comparisons 
between these aspects of Nixon’s case and President Trump’s approach 
to investigations demonstrates the radical nature of Trump’s 
arguments. 
Like President Trump, a cohort of President Nixon’s campaign staff 
was involved in potentially criminal conduct aimed at hobbling the 
chances of Nixon’s political opponents.55 They broke into the 
Democratic Party headquarters at the Watergate Complex in 
Washington, D.C., where they had planned to photograph campaign 
documents and install wiretaps in telephones.56 The DNC Chairman’s 
phone was among the phones to be tapped.57 But the wiretaps were not 
 
 55.  See generally JOHN DEAN, THE NIXON DEFENSE: WHAT HE KNEW AND WHEN HE 
KNEW IT 12–13 (2014) (describing a conspiracy to break into the DNC offices at the Watergate 
Hotel to plant eavesdropping devices).  
 56.  Walter Rugaber, Watergate Trial in Closed Session, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 18, 1973), 
https://www.nytimes.com/1973/01/18/archives/watergate-trial-in-closed-session-judge-clears-
court-to-hear.html.  
 57.  Robert Pear, Watergate, Then and Now—2 Decades After a Political Burglary, the 
Questions Still Linger, N.Y. TIMES (Jun. 15, 1992), 
https://www.nytimes.com/1992/06/15/us/watergate-then-now-2-decades-after-political-burglary-
questions-still-linger.html.  
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entirely effective, so the conspirators had to return to the scene of the 
crime to repair the problems.58 A security guard noticed the intruders 
when they returned the second time, and he alerted police. Five men 
were arrested at the scene and charged with attempted burglary and 
attempted interception of telephone and other communications.59 By 
January 1973, the burglars had been convicted or had pleaded guilty—
just days after Nixon’s second inauguration.60 
White House officials moved to distance President Nixon from the 
criminal endeavor. John Dean, a White House lawyer, later testified 
that a top Nixon aide, John Ehrlichman, had ordered him to destroy 
evidence.61 Nixon blocked FBI investigations into the source of funding 
for the burglaries.62 Dean believed he could go to prosecutors and tell 
them the truth in order to protect Nixon, but when he discussed this 
plan with Nixon, he suspected that the President was recording their 
conversations.63 Later, during Senate hearings, Dean revealed this 
suspicion, which triggered Congressional and grand jury subpoenas for 
what became known as “the Nixon tapes.”64 
Department of Justice Special Prosecutor Archibald Cox and the 
Senate subpoenaed the tapes, but Nixon asserted Executive Privilege 
over them.65 Once former senior White House aides had been indicted, 
Nixon released transcripts of the relevant White House tapes in an 
acknowledgement that they were not entirely shielded by privilege. 
Still, believing the audio would be far more damaging, he continued 
fighting to keep the recordings hidden. 
The Supreme Court took up the Executive Privilege issue in United 
 
 58.  Id. 
 59.  Id. 
 60.  Trials began January 8, 1973; E. Howard Hunt pled guilty January 11; four others pled 
guilty January 15; two others were convicted after trial on January 30. THE WATERGATE FILES: 
TIMELINE, 
https://www.fordlibrarymuseum.gov/museum/exhibits/watergate_files/content.php?section=1&p
age=a (last visited Feb. 13, 2021). 
 61.  DEAN, supra note 55, at 425. 
 62.  Alfred E. Lewis, 5 Held in Plot to Bug Democrats’ Office Here, WASH. POST (Jun. 18, 
1972),  https://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2002/05/31/AR2005111001227.html.  
 63.  DEAN, supra note 55, at 240–41. 
 64.  Id. 
 65.  United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 686 (1974). It should be noted that President Nixon 
fired Cox and several other Department of Justice officials in an effort to curtail the investigation, 
but the subpoena for the tapes was continued by Cox’s successor, Leon Jaworski. Carroll 
Kilpatrick, Nixon Forces Firing of Cox; Richardson, Ruckelshaus Quit, WASH. POST, Oct. 21, 1973 
at A01. 
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States v. Nixon.66 The Court denied President Nixon’s motion to quash 
subpoenas, which were issued by a federal court and had directed 
Nixon to produce certain tape recordings and documents relating to his 
conversations with aides and advisors.67 Nixon’s journey to the Court 
was a short one. During the criminal investigations, Cox’s subpoena for 
the Nixon tapes was issued by the U.S. District Court for the District of 
Columbia.68 The President appealed the decision to the Court of 
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, but before the D.C. 
Circuit could hear the case, the U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari 
to review the case immediately.69 The Court circumvented the normal 
process because of “the public importance of the issues presented” and 
“the need for their prompt resolution.”70 
Because Nixon had cooperated with the prosecutor, the prosecutor 
was able to narrow the scope of the subpoena, avoiding a broad 
demand for all Nixon’s Oval Office tape recordings and a serious 
Executive Privilege problem. In Nixon, the Court described the 
subpoena process, including several important characterizations 
pertinent to the comparison to President Trump’s approach. It 
characterized the subpoena as requiring “the production . . . of certain 
tapes, transcripts, or other writings relating to certain precisely 
identified meetings between the President and others.”71 This 
description suggests that the subpoena was narrowly tailored to specific 
tapes and was not a broad demand for all tapes that existed. The Court 
also noted that the “Special Prosecutor was able to fix the time, place, 
and persons present at these discussions because the White House daily 
logs and appointment records had been delivered to him.”72 
The Court also pointed out that President Nixon had filed a motion 
to quash the subpoenas to accompany his claim of privilege over their 
contents.73 A large portion of the Court’s opinion in Nixon is devoted 
to the motion to quash analysis. The Court held that subpoenas “may 
be quashed if their production would be unreasonable or unproductive, 
but not otherwise.”74 The Court outlined three hurdles for the 
 
 66.  See generally id. 
 67.  Id. 
 68.  Id. at 686. 
 69.  Id. at 686–87. 
 70.  Id. at 687. 
 71.  Id. at 688. 
 72.  Id.  
 73.  Id. at 688. 
 74.  Id. at 700. 
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prosecutor to meet to obtain the tapes: relevancy, admissibility, and 
specificity.75 The Court determined that the subpoenas at issue had 
cleared all three hurdles: Dean’s Senate testimony rendered the tapes 
relevant, the Court had decided Executive Privilege did not apply to 
potentially criminal conduct, which meant the evidence was admissible, 
and the subpoenas’ level of specificity (a product of Nixon’s partial 
cooperation) made them reasonable.76 The Court held that there was a 
sufficient likelihood that the tapes contained conversations relevant to 
the offenses charged in the indictment of Nixon’s associates.77 The 
Court also deferred to the district court’s discretion because it was the 
best arbiter for deciding whether a subpoena was necessary.78 Although 
the Court noted that where a subpoena is directed to the president of 
the United States, appellate review should be particularly meticulous, 
the Court nevertheless did not establish any heightened standard of 
scrutiny for presidential subpoenas.79 
The Court then evaluated President Nixon’s claim of Executive 
Privilege over the Oval Office tapes.80 Nixon claimed that Executive 
Privilege was absolute for all communications as they related to 
Executive Branch duties, but he did not claim that Executive Privilege 
applied to all of his communications writ large during his presidency.81 
In any event, his strategy proved futile. The Supreme Court explicitly 
rejected President Nixon’s arguments for absolute, unqualified 
presidential immunity from judicial process for all conversations 
relating to Executive Branch duties.82 Even for presidential 
communications covered by Executive Privilege, the Court found that 
“absent a claim of need to protect military, diplomatic or sensitive 
national security secrets,” it is difficult to accept that “even the very 
important interest in confidentiality of Presidential communications” 
precludes production of evidence to a court of law under a subpoena.83 
The Court determined that the public “has a right to every man’s 
evidence, except for those persons protected by constitutional, 
common law or statutory privilege.”84 The Court passed comment on 
 
 75.  Id. 
 76.  Id. 
 77.  Id. 
 78.  Id. at 702. 
 79.  Id.  
 80.  Id. at 703. 
 81.  Id. at 705. 
 82.  Id. at 706. 
 83.  Id. 
 84.  Id. at 709. 
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the breadth of Nixon’s claim, too: “No case of the Court . . . has 
extended this high degree of deference to a President’s generalized 
interest in confidentiality.”85 In light of Nixon, President Trump’s far 
more expansive requests for deference to his even more generalized 
interest in confidentiality demonstrate that the legal system has grown 
too weak to impose meaningful accountability on the President, despite 
the clarity provided by the Supreme Court decades ago. 
B.  President Clinton’s Approach 
President Clinton also faced multiple investigations into his 
conduct over the course of his two terms. Two features of President 
Clinton’s approach warrant review. First, President Clinton 
cooperated—somewhat extensively—with a series of investigations 
that spanned nearly all eight years of his presidency. Second, Clinton’s 
claim of absolute immunity from a civil proceeding was resoundingly 
rejected in accordance with longstanding precedent. 
Civil lawsuits, in tandem with a long-running investigation by 
Independent Counsel Kenneth Starr, spawned legal headaches for 
Clinton that ultimately resulted in his impeachment.86 He was first 
investigated for connections to Whitewater Development Corporation 
and a failed savings and loan company.87 Under the contours of an 
independent counsel statute passed in the wake of the Nixon era, a 
special judicial panel appointed attorney Kenneth Starr to investigate 
the matter.88 
Similar to the Senate’s simultaneous hearings on subjects related to 
the Nixon criminal investigations, Republicans in Congress voted to 
enforce subpoenas for notes taken at joint meetings between the White 
House Counsel’s office and Clinton’s private lawyers.89 Although the 
White House initially resisted, Clinton ultimately provided the notes, 
despite viable claims of attorney-client privilege.90 In fact, both Nixon 
and Clinton provided documents in response to subpoenas for 
potentially privileged evidence. This pattern continued as the 
investigative train rolled through a number of other “scandals” that 
 
 85.  Id. at 711. 
 86.  Charles Tiefer, The Specially Investigated President, 5 U. CHI. L. SCH. ROUNDTABLE 
143, 143–44 (1998).  
 87.  Id. at 155. The investigation escalated when Deputy White House Counsel Vincent 
Foster died by suicide, giving rise to speculation of a coverup. Id. 
 88.  Id. 
 89.  Id. at 156. 
 90.  Id. 
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emerged during Clinton’s tenure: “Travelgate,” an investigation into 
the dismissal of seven employees at the White House travel office, 
“Filegate,” an investigation into delayed production of files by the 
White House Counsel’s office, and “Bosniagate,” an investigation into 
Clinton’s permission of arms shipments between Iran and Bosnia 
without Congressional approval. Other investigations included probes 
into campaign finance matters, First Lady Hillary Clinton’s possible 
obstruction, and, of course, President Clinton’s extramarital affairs and 
his allegedly perjurious comments about them.91 Clinton complied to 
some extent with each of these investigations.92 
During Clinton’s first term, Paula Jones, a former employee of the 
Arkansas Industrial Development Commission, sued him and another 
man for sexual harassment during Clinton’s gubernatorial 
administration.93 Clinton “promptly advised the District Court that he 
intended to file a motion to dismiss on grounds of Presidential 
immunity, and requested the court to defer all other pleadings and 
motions until after the immunity issue was resolved.”94 The District 
Court denied his motion to dismiss, on the grounds that even the most 
favorable case for Clinton limited presidential immunity to acts 
incidental to the official duties of the presidency.95 The judge did stay 
the trial proceedings until after Clinton’s term had ended, but 
permitted discovery to continue.96 Clinton appealed to the Eighth 
Circuit and lost.97 The Supreme Court granted certiorari. 
The Court was unsparing: “Petitioner’s principal submission—that 
‘in all but the most exceptional cases,’ the Constitution affords the 
President temporary immunity from civil damages litigation arising out 
of events that occurred before he took office—cannot be sustained on 
the basis of precedent.”98 The primary concern for presidential 
immunity, the Court held, is rooted in the desire to avoid a President 
being “unduly cautious in the discharge of his official duties.”99 In short, 
 
 91.  Id. at 156–60. 
 92.  Id. 
 93.  Clinton v. Jones, 520 U.S. 681, 684–85 (1997).  
 94.  Id. at 686. 
 95.  See id. at 686 (citing Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731 (1997), for the proposition that 
the president has “absolute immunity from civil damage actions arising out of the execution of 
the official duties of office” but that immunity was not so expansive it gave the president absolute 
immunity while in office). 
 96.  Id. at 688. 
 97.  Clinton v. Jones, 72 F.3d 1354, 1361 (8th Cir. 1996). 
 98.  Jones, 520 U.S. at 692. 
 99.  Id. at 694 (citing United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 752 n. 32 (1974)). 
DENAULT_03_11_21_FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 3/14/2021  4:26 PM 
2021] PRESIDENTIAL IMMUNITY, SPECIAL COUNSEL REFORMS, & TRUMP 161 
presidential immunity is meant to empower a President to carry out the 
duties of his office without fear of litigation over every official decision 
he makes. 
That reasoning “provides no support for an immunity for unofficial 
conduct,”100 meaning Clinton could not claim presidential immunity for 
conduct that had occurred before he became president. Justice Stevens 
was particularly explicit in making this point: “[W]e have never 
suggested that the President, or any other official, has an immunity that 
extends beyond the scope of any action taken in an official capacity.”101 
The Court considered the Founders’ perspectives on presidential 
subpoenas and decided that the historical sources were ultimately 
inconclusive.102 Nevertheless, Jones stands for the principle that, unless 
a suit involves or encroaches upon Executive duties, a president is not 
immune from suit merely because a proceeding may upset or distract 
him.103 
The Court examined the long history of presidential compliance 
with legal proceedings to demonstrate that Clinton’s total immunity 
argument had little merit. Many examples pepper our nation’s history. 
Chief Justice Marshall ruled that it was lawful to subpoena President 
Jefferson in the treason trial of Aaron Burr.104 President Monroe 
responded to written interrogatories.105 President Grant voluntarily 
gave a lengthy deposition in a criminal investigation.106 President Nixon 
complied with the subpoena for his Oval Office tapes.107 President Ford 
gave a deposition in a criminal trial.108 And Clinton himself had already 
been deposed for two criminal proceedings.109 
It is important to note what the Court did not decide in Jones: the 
Court did not consider whether a comparable claim might succeed in a 
 
 100.  Id. 
 101.  Id. (emphasis added).  
 102.  The Court briefly examined Clinton’s reference to President Jefferson’s protest of a 
subpoena for his testimony during the trial of Aaron Burr, but balanced it with Jones’s 
counterevidence of comments at the Constitutional Convention that the president is amenable to 
the law “in his private character as a citizen, and in his public character by impeachment.” Id. at 
695–96. 
 103.  Id. at 701. 
 104.  Id. at 703–04.  
 105.  Id. at 704. 
 106.  Id. 
 107.  See United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 714 (1974) (referencing the District Court’s in 
camera review of document obtained via subpoena). 
 108.  See United States v. Fromme, 405 F. Supp. 578, 583 (E.D. Cal. 1975) (requiring President 
Ford to give a deposition). 
 109.  Id. 
DENAULT_03_11_21_FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 3/14/2021  4:26 PM 
162 DUKE JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW & PUBLIC POLICY SIDEBAR [VOL. 16 
state tribunal and noted that if the case was being heard in a state 
forum, then concerns about federalism, comity, and local prejudice 
would arise.110 It was from this small hill President Trump launched his 
constitutional battle in Vance, asserting a different kind of total 
immunity from subpoenas issued by a state grand jury, despite the logic 
of his arguments flying in the face of the reasoning established in Jones 
and Nixon. 
C.  President Trump’s Approach 
President Trump went farther than Nixon or Clinton, especially by 
claiming total immunity from a criminal investigation because of its 
state-level origin. While Trump’s claim was ostensibly grounded in the 
fact that the Supreme Court had never addressed whether a state grand 
jury could subpoena a sitting president,111 the logic of nearly all Trump’s 
arguments applied to federal criminal proceedings, too.112 
Trump’s positions in both subpoena cases were rife with 
inconsistencies. When House Committees subpoenaed Deutsche Bank 
and Mazars in April 2019, Trump contested the move by arguing the 
subpoenas had no legislative purpose, amounted to Congress 
improperly engaging in “law enforcement,” and violated separation of 
powers principles.113 Aside from the inconsistency that Trump was suing 
in his private capacity and not as president (and thus no separation of 
powers issue had arisen in the traditional sense),114 his argument that 
Congress shouldn’t engage in law enforcement was rendered somewhat 
illogical when he also opposed a subpoena from traditional law 
enforcement—the Manhattan D.A.—for the very same documents. 
Turning to a different argument entirely to block that subpoena, Trump, 
his businesses, and his family argued that President Trump enjoyed 
“absolute immunity” from state criminal process under Article II and 
the Supremacy Clause.115 Trump argued that Congress could not play 
law enforcement, but also that state law enforcement could not 
 
 110.  Jones, 520 U.S. at 691. 
 111.  Id. (emphasis added). 
 112.  Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Trump v. Vance, 140 S. Ct. 2412 (2020) (No. 19-3204) 
(claiming that Article II and the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution dictate that the president 
of the United States cannot be subject to criminal process while in office with no rationale 
excluding federal criminal process from that assertion (emphasis added)). 
 113.  Trump v. Mazars USA, LLP, 140 S. Ct. 2019, 2022–32 (2020). 
 114.  Id. at 2034 (stressing that separation of powers concerns were “no less palpable” because 
President Trump sued in his personal capacity, but stopping short of accepting the dispute as a 
traditional separation of powers problem). 
 115.  Trump v. Vance, 140 S. Ct. 2412, 2416 (2020). 
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investigate Trump by virtue of his status as president, implicitly 
endorsing the view that the only government entity that could 
investigate the president is the very branch he himself controls. 
At every stage, President Trump’s arguments failed.116 Starting with 
the Congressional subpoenas, the D.C. Circuit held that Congress has a 
broad ability to investigate pursuant to legislation and that the mere 
act of requesting materials relating to a president does not violate 
separation of powers principles.117 Evaluating Congress’s Deutsche 
Bank subpoena, the Second Circuit similarly concluded that because 
the subpoena’s purposes were not pretextual, the Court would defer to 
Congress’s assertion that its legislative purpose was valid.118 The court 
noted the privacy interests of President Trump “should be accorded 
more significance than those of an ordinary citizen because [he] is the 
President,” in part because it “risk[s] at least some distraction of the 
Nation’s Chief Executive in the performance of his official duties.”119 
Nonetheless, the Second Circuit concluded that because claims of 
presidential distraction historically have applied narrowly, notably in 
both Nixon and Jones,120 it could not justify blocking a subpoena to 
third parties—which required no action on Trump’s part—as an 
encroachment on his official duties as president.121 
The absolute immunity argument against the state grand jury 
subpoena fared poorly as well. The District Judge denied Trump’s 
initial request to block the subpoena.122 The Second Circuit affirmed, 
placing Trump’s arguments in historical context. Importantly, the 
Second Circuit’s reasoning mirrors—almost precisely—the Supreme 
Court’s ultimate conclusion.123 The Second Circuit began with the 
 
 116.  See, e.g., Trump v. Deutsche Bank AG, 943 F.3d 627, 652 (2d Cir. 2019) (citing Quinn v. 
United States, 349 U.S. 155, 160–61 (1955), for the proposition that inquiry into private affairs—
even of the president—is valid as long as the inquiry is related to a valid legislative purpose); 
Trump v. Mazars, 940 F.3d 710, 723 (D.C. Cir. 2019) (holding that the “power of the Congress to 
conduct investigations . . . is broad” and that it “encompasses inquiries concerning the 
administration of existing laws as well as proposed or possibly needed statutes”). 
 117.  Mazars, 940 F.3d at 733–34. 
 118.  Id. 
 119.  Deutsche Bank AG, 943 F.3d at 675.  
 120.  Id. 
 121.  Id. 
 122.  Trump v. Vance, 395 F. Supp. 3d 283, 290 (S.D.N.Y. 2019).  
 123.  Trump v. Vance, 140 S. Ct. 2412, 2431 (2020) (concluding “Two hundred years ago, a 
great jurist of our Court established that no citizen, not even the President, is categorically above 
the common duty to produce evidence when called upon in a criminal proceeding. We reaffirm 
that principle today and hold that the President is neither absolutely immune from state criminal 
subpoenas . . . nor entitled to a heightened standard of need.”). 
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history: 
Over 200 years ago, Chief Justice Marshall . . . upheld the issuance 
of a subpoena duces tecum to President Jefferson. Consistent with 
that historical understanding, presidents have been ordered to give 
deposition testimony or provide materials in response to subpoenas. 
In particular, “the exercise of jurisdiction [over the President] has 
been held warranted” when necessary to vindicate public interest in 
an ongoing criminal prosecution . . . . The President relies on what 
he described at oral argument as “temporary absolute presidential 
immunity”—he argues that he is absolutely immune from all stages 
of state criminal process while in office . . . . [A]fter reviewing 
historical and legal precedent, we conclude . . . that presidential 
immunity does not bar the enforcement of a state grand jury 
subpoena directing a third party to produce non-privileged material, 
even when the subject matter under investigation pertains to the 
President.124 
Noticing President Trump’s logical departure from Nixon, the 
Second Circuit was troubled by Trump’s failure to assert privilege in 
any form.125 Because President Trump’s financial documents were not 
privileged, it was hard to imagine they should warrant more protection 
than the Nixon tapes, which enjoyed at least a colorable claim of 
Executive Privilege.126 Furthermore, the grand jury subpoena was 
issued to a third party, not President Trump.127 The Second Circuit 
found no support in Nixon for the proposition that a president’s 
“private and non-privileged documents may be absolutely shielded” 
from scrutiny.128 Trump went 0–3 in his efforts to block both Congress’s 
and the grand jury’s subpoenas before reaching the Supreme Court.129 
The D.C. Circuit and Second Circuit agreed that Congress’s subpoena 
power is broad and that Trump’s arguments for absolute immunity 
from state grand juries were unfounded in the law.130 Despite the 
 
 124.  Trump v. Vance, 941 F.3d 631, 640 (2d Cir. 2019) (internal citations omitted). 
 125.  See id. at 641 (stressing that Nixon’s claim of Executive Privilege—while unsuccessful—
at least presented a legitimate rationale for quashing the subpoena. President Trump offered no 
similar rationale).  
 126.  Id. 
 127.  Id. at 640. 
 128.  See id. (comparing Trump’s argument to the Nixon Court’s conclusion that even 
documents exposing the president’s confidential, official conversations may properly be obtained 
by subpoena). 
 129.  Vance, 941 F.3d at 631; Trump v. Deutsche Bank AG, 943 F.3d 627, 675 (2d Cir. 2019); 
Trump v. Mazars USA, LLP, 940 F.3d 710, 723 (D.C. Cir. 2019). 
 130.  Vance, 941 F.3d at 631; Trump v. Deutsche Bank AG, 943 F.3d 627, 675 (2d Cir. 2019); 
Trump v. Mazars USA, LLP, 940 F.3d 710, 723 (D.C. Cir. 2019). 
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apparent lack of a circuit split or even a particularly novel question of 
law, the Supreme Court accepted both cases for review and scheduled 
them for argument in March 2020—as public interest in Trump’s 
financial history continued to grow.131 
The arguments in the Vance case did not really present novel 
questions of law, beyond the question of whether state grand juries can 
subpoena a sitting president. But Trump did not focus his argument so 
narrowly: His lawyers argued that Article II and the Supremacy Clause 
required that presidential immunity applied to any criminal process, 
which implicitly included federal criminal process and thus 
contradicted both Nixon and Jones.132 Trump differentiated his claim 
from Nixon’s not based on distinctions between federal and state 
prosecutors, but on the fact that the Special Prosecutor in Nixon 
disclaimed any intent to indict Nixon during his presidency—a 
distinction which bears little (if any) resemblance to federalism 
principles, comity concerns or Vance’s status as a local state 
prosecutor.133 Trump’s concerns about state grand jury subpoenas 
encroaching on the office of the president also applied equally to 
federal prosecutors.134 The core of Trump’s claim was not that state 
prosecutors are uniquely unsuited to investigate a president in our 
federalist system, but rather that “issuing compulsory criminal process 
to the sitting President, when it is accompanied by a threat of 
indictment, crosses a constitutional line.”135 
At oral argument, Chief Justice Roberts punctured that balloon: 
“[F]or all that, you don’t argue that the grand jury cannot investigate 
the President, do you?”136 President Trump’s counsel dodged the 
question by claiming they were not seeking to enjoin the grand jury 
 
 131.  See Democrat Schiff Questions If Mueller Probing Trump-Deutsche Bank Link, 
REUTERS (Feb. 10, 2019), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-trump-russia/democrat-schiff-
questions-if-mueller-probing-trump-deutsche-bank-link-idUSKCN1PZ0PU (describing a “wide 
investigation into . . . Trump’s financial dealings, including ‘credible reports of money laundering 
and financial compromise’”). 
 132.  Transcript of Oral Argument at 5–6, Trump v. Vance, 140 S. Ct. 2412 (2020) (No. 19-
635). In pursuit of this argument, President Trump’s counsel acknowledged President Trump was 
being investigated for criminal violations by a state grand jury and claimed subpoenas targeting 
the president, even addressed to third parties, violated the Constitution. Id.  
 133.  Brief for Petitioner, Trump v. Vance, 140 S. Ct. 2412 (2020) (No. 19-3204) at 7. 
 134.  Id. at 5–7. Trump raised the prospects of being indicted while in office, distraction from 
official duties, and public stigma and opprobrium resulting from criminal investigation as reasons 
to caution against permitting criminal investigations of a sitting president. Each of these logically 
applies to federal investigations, too. 
 135.  Id. at 9. 
 136.  Id. (emphasis added). 
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investigation but were instead arguing for temporary immunity to the 
grand jury’s subpoenas.137 The Chief Justice noted the logical problem: 
“Well, in other words, it’s okay for the grand jury to investigate, except 
it can’t use the traditional and most effective device that grand juries 
have typically used to investigate, which is the subpoena?”138 
Ultimately, the Court did not overrule decades of precedent in 
favor of President Trump’s novel legal theory that subpoenas relating 
to the president are invalid when issued by state grand juries. In Vance, 
the Court concluded that “Article II and the Supremacy Clause do not 
categorically preclude, [n]or require a heightened standard for, the 
issuance of a state criminal subpoena to a sitting President.”139 It was 
not exactly new precedent—the Court’s holding was consistent with 
what it previously held in Nixon and Jones.140 Still, other distinctions 
about how the cases unfolded warrant scrutiny. 
President Trump never asserted any colorable claim of privilege, 
unlike Nixon.141 Trump argued that there should be a heightened 
standard for any subpoena issued to the president, which was squarely 
inconsistent with the analysis in Nixon,142 in spirit if not in law. With 
respect to the evidence, Trump advocated for protections over 
unprivileged evidence about unofficial conduct broader than those 
Nixon had advocated for. Plus, Nixon sought to protect privileged 
evidence relating to official conduct—and Nixon’s claim was 
rejected.143 Exacerbating the expansive scope of this new theory was 
Trump’s total refusal to cooperate with investigators, which again 
differentiated him from Nixon in that it made narrowing the subpoenas 
impossible for prosecutors or Congress.144 
 
 137.  Id. 
 138.  Id. 
 139.  Trump v. Vance, 140 S. Ct. 2412, 2416 (2020). 
 140.  Compare Trump’s argument that presidents are absolutely immune from criminal 
process to the holding in Nixon, where the Court concluded that “to read the Art. II powers of 
the President as providing an absolute privilege as against a subpoena essential to the 
enforcement of criminal statutes . . . would upset the constitutional balance of a ‘workable 
government.’”; cf. Clinton v. Jones, 520 U.S. 681, 705 (1997) (“[F]ederal courts have the power to 
determine the legality of [the president’s] unofficial conduct.”).  
 141.  See discussion supra notes 65–85 and accompanying text (describing that Nixon asserted 
Executive Privilege over tapes of conversations in the Oval Office and lost). 
 142.  See discussion supra notes 73–79 and accompanying text (describing that the Supreme 
Court in Nixon said only that meticulous review was warranted for presidential subpoenas but 
declined to establish a heightened standard).  
 143.  See discussion supra notes 81–85 and accompanying text (describing that Nixon 
characterized the president’s claims as the high watermark of presidential immunity—and denied 
them—but President Trump’s arguments went much higher). 
 144.  See discussion supra notes 71–72 and accompanying text (describing that Nixon offered 
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Other distinctions arose from the way the federal courts handled 
the Trump cases. The Supreme Court did not expedite hearing over the 
issues relating to a criminal investigation involving President Trump, 
again departing from Nixon.145 It also entertained his broad 
constitutional claim of absolute immunity without requiring him to file 
an accompanying motion to quash or asking him to make alternative 
arguments in the event his immunity claim failed, as Nixon had.146 
Trump tried painstakingly to avoid both the political and legal 
implications of Nixon and the logical conclusions emanating from it, 
and federal courts allowed him to successfully do so. 
While Trump’s legal claim of absolute immunity bore some 
similarity to Clinton’s claim in Jones, Trump categorically refused to 
cooperate with any investigation into his financial affairs—unlike 
Clinton.147 Trump effectively ignored the long line of historical 
precedent that supported the Court’s rejection of presidential 
immunity in Jones.148 And he ignored the Jones principle that presidents 
challenging subpoenas on the grounds they will distract from the office 
must show that the subpoena actually encroaches upon the duties of 
the presidency. In other words, such challenges cannot be justified by 
mere emotional distraction.149 
Alarmingly, Trump’s legal contortions continued on past the 
Supreme Court. After the Court upheld the subpoenas in Vance, it 
 
White House logs to investigators, allowing prosecutors to subpoena specific tapes instead of the 
contents of all Oval Office tapes in Nixon’s possession). 
 145.  See discussion supra note 69 and accompanying text (describing that the Court expedited 
appellate process over Nixon’s claim of Executive Privilege but did not do so for the Manhattan 
D.A. subpoena over the President’s financial documents). 
 146.  See discussion supra notes 73–79 and accompanying text. The Second Circuit noted—
albeit in litigation after the Supreme Court’s decision in Vance—that a party would ordinarily 
challenge a subpoena like the one at issue by filing a motion to quash before the state court that 
had impaneled the grand jury. Trump v. Vance, 977 F.3d 198, 207 (2d. Cir. 2020). Such motions 
trigger a clear analysis courts regularly undertake. In Trump’s case, it meant he would bear the 
burden of coming forward with concrete evidence sufficient to rebut the presumption of validity 
accorded to Grand Jury subpoenas, something the Second Circuit noted was “no small feat.” Id. 
But Trump never filed a motion to quash in a single case where he opposed subpoenas during his 
presidency. 
 147.  See discussion supra notes 89–91 and accompanying text (describing that Clinton 
complied with several investigations by Congress and prosecutors, turning over potentially 
privileged evidence in the process). 
 148.  See discussion supra notes 98–103 and accompanying text (describing that the Supreme 
Court was explicit in Jones that presidential immunity covers official conduct and that 
“distraction” applies only to the official duties of the presidency, not emotional distraction). 
 149.  See discussion supra notes 98–103 and accompanying text (describing how discovery in 
a civil case that involved President Clinton was not sufficient “distraction” to intrude on his 
official duties). 
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remanded the case to the District Court for further argument on the 
issues of overbreadth, bad faith, and other possible Article II-specific 
avenues.150 This District Court heard expedited argument on President 
Trump’s new claims that the subpoenas were overbroad or issued in 
bad faith. But Trump curiously presented them through a constitutional 
claim raised under 42 U.S.C. § 1983,151 again failing to raise the 
straightforward motion to quash through which these new claims 
would normally be brought.152 The District Court rejected his 
arguments just weeks after the Supreme Court remanded the case in a 
lengthy 103-page ruling which articulated frustration with Trump’s 
legal tactics: 
The President began this action by invoking Article II to raise a 
sweeping claim of immunity rejected by every court to consider it. 
He then received guidance on potentially valid challenges to the 
Mazars Subpoena, including ones specifically tied to Article II, from 
no less an authority than the Supreme Court. He . . . raised claims of 
bad faith and overbreadth available to the broader public and 
conclusorily [sic] asserted that these alleged defects in the grand 
jury process violated his Article II rights. The Court is not persuaded 
. . . . Justice requires an end to this controversy.153 
Trump predictably appealed. More than a year since the issuance of 
the criminal subpoena by the grand jury, the Second Circuit again 
concluded Trump’s arguments were without merit.154 The court 
expressed particular confusion about why he brought a § 1983 claim 
and openly suggested that Trump had engaged in peculiar legal tactics 
to avoid the harsh motion to quash standard:155 
The procedural posture of this case . . . is unusual. A party would 
ordinarily challenge a subpoena like the one at issue by filing a 
motion to quash before the state court that had impaneled the grand 
jury. As noted above, to prevail on an ordinary motion to quash, the 
moving party bears the burden to come forward with ‘concrete 
evidence’ sufficient to rebut ‘the presumption of validity accorded 
 
 150.  Trump v. Vance, 140 S. Ct. 2412, 2419 (2020). 
 151.  A § 1983 claim is a federal cause of action which provides for civil actions when a 
“person . . . subjects . . . any citizen of the United States . . . to the deprivation of any rights, 
privileges or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws.” 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2018). President 
Trump claimed state prosecutors were depriving him of his constitutional rights as a president by 
subpoenaing his accounting firm. 
 152.  Trump v. Vance, No. 19 Civ. 8694, slip op. at 103 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 20, 2020). 
 153.  Id. (emphasis added). 
 154.  Trump v. Vance, 977 F.3d 198, 207 (2d. Cir. 2020). 
 155.  Id. at 207. 
DENAULT_03_11_21_FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 3/14/2021  4:26 PM 
2021] PRESIDENTIAL IMMUNITY, SPECIAL COUNSEL REFORMS, & TRUMP 169 
to Grand Jury subpoenas.156 
The Second Circuit later stressed this standard would have 
presented Trump with “no small feat.”157 But because Trump made this 
other § 1983 claim instead, the District Attorney was forced to file a 
motion to dismiss Trump’s claim, reversing the burden.158 The motion 
to dismiss standard differs significantly from the motion to quash 
standard: The prosecutor’s motion to dismiss would fail if Trump’s 
stated facts—which must be presumed as true—presented a viable 
claim.159 Under a motion to quash test, however, it would be the 
subpoena that enjoys the presumption of validity, and Trump would 
bear the burden of demonstrating its bad faith or overbreadth.160 But 
Trump contended that presuming the validity of the subpoena, as a 
court would under a motion to quash test, would somehow unfairly 
impose a heightened pleading standard on him.161 The Second Circuit 
flatly disagreed.162 But then it suggested that Trump did not need to 
rebut the presumption of validity at this stage, implying that it was 
engaging in a mixture of the motion to quash and motion to dismiss 
analyses.163 Regardless of this confusion, Trump lost and appealed—
again—to the Supreme Court, where the petition remained 
unanswered until February 2021, about eighteen months after the 
original issuance of the criminal grand jury subpoena.164 The electorate 
did not know whether there were “protracted periods of criminal 
conduct” at Trump’s business before the November 2020 election.165 
President Trump’s absolutist arguments were not limited to 
financial investigations, either. When the House subpoenaed testimony 
from former White House Counsel Don McGahn and documents he 
possessed in pursuit of an impeachment investigation related to 
obstruction of justice,166 McGahn refused to comply unless an 
 
 156.  Id. at 206–07. 
 157.  Id. at 207. 
 158.  Id. 
 159.  Id. 
 160.  Id. (emphasis added). 
 161.  Id. (emphasis added). 
 162.  See id. (“We disagree.”). 
 163.  Id. 
 164.  Arian de Vogue, Supreme Court allows release of Trump tax returns to NY prosecutor, 
CNN (Feb. 22, 2021 3:56 PM), https://www.cnn.com/2021/02/22/politics/supreme-court-trump-
taxes-vance/index.html.  
 165.  William K. Rashbaum & Benjamin Weiser, D.A. is Investigating Trump and His 
Company Over Fraud, Filing Suggests, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 3, 2020), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/08/03/nyregion/donald-trump-taxes-cyrus-vance.html. 
 166.  Comm. on the Judiciary of the U.S. H.R. v. McGahn, 951 F.3d 510, 514 (D.C. Cir. 2020).  
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accommodation was reached with the White House.167 Trump argued 
that certain White House advisors enjoy total immunity from 
compelled testimony about matters relating to their service of the 
president.168 The ensuing battle, which presented a closer constitutional 
question about Executive Privilege and presidential immunity, still 
provided important guidance that will be relevant to remedies 
considered in Part III. 
The House brought suit to enforce the subpoena and won in 
District Court, but a three-judge panel at the D.C. Circuit Court of 
Appeals reversed on the grounds the House Committee lacked 
standing to sue.169 The full D.C. Circuit later reversed the panel 
decision, determining after en banc review that the House did in fact 
have standing.170 The D.C. Circuit noted that when the House of 
Representatives employs its subpoena power in service of its 
impeachment power, then a subpoena to White House aides for 
testimony is an enforceable demand for information, and questions of 
Executive Privilege must be raised and litigated separately—again 
rejecting President Trump’s claim of absolute immunity for an 
approach that bore closer resemblance to typical American legal 
procedure.171 
Importantly, the original panel at the D.C. Circuit—after receiving 
the case on remand—ruled that there was no cause of action for the 
House to pursue subpoenas in court, rendering enforcement of the 
subpoena impossible despite the House’s standing to bring the suit.172  
The decision was grounded in the fact that Congress has “granted an 
express cause of action to the Senate—but not to the House” for 
enforcing subpoenas through civil litigation.173 While Congressional 
lawyers insisted that a federal court could grant equitable relief on its 
own under Article III, the panel disagreed with that, too: The existence 
of the statutory power in the Senate implies courts cannot infer it for 
the House.174 The court also expressed reluctance at characterizing an 
“interbranch information dispute” between branches of government as 
 
 167.  Id. 
 168.  Id.  
 169.  Id. 
 170.  Comm. on the Judiciary of the U.S. H.R. v. McGahn, 968 F.3d 755, 760 (D.C. Cir. 2020) 
(en banc). 
 171.  Id. at 765. 
 172.  Comm. on the Judiciary of the U.S. H.R. v. McGahn, 973 F.3d 121, 123 (D.C. Cir. 2020) 
(on remand from reh’g en banc).  
 173.  See id. (citing 2 U.S.C. § 288d and 28 U.S.C. § 1365(b)). 
 174.  Id. at 123–24. 
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a traditional equitable claim.175 The panel pointed out that the line of 
cases used in support of equitable relief all cited statutory powers, not 
constitutional ones like impeachment.176 
It is clear the D.C. Circuit struggled with constitutional questions 
about enforcing Congressional subpoenas to the Executive Branch. 
The judges cited the fact that Congress’s power to enforce subpoenas 
is currently limited to two avenues: a statutory criminal contempt 
mechanism and the inherent congressional contempt power.177 
According to the panel, because Congress had not passed legislation 
creating a civil subpoena enforcement power for the House, it had 
none.178 Critically, the panel practically invited legislators to take up the 
cause: “We note that this decision does not preclude Congress (or one 
of its chambers) from ever enforcing a subpoena in federal court; it 
simply precludes it from doing so without first enacting a statute 
authorizing such a suit.”179 McGahn’s testimony has still not been 
received by the House of Representatives. 
President Trump’s legal tactics, combined with his public and 
private obstruction of the Special Counsel investigation, blocked 
multiple branches of government from critical evidence related to his 
conduct. Part III dives deeper into particularly problematic aspects of 
President Trump’s approach to subpoenas. It also presents several 
courses of action to remedy the confusion that resulted from the 
Special Counsel investigation, Trump’s exploitation of deference to the 
presidency in courts of law, and the lack of a clear statutory scheme for 
subpoenas issued to the president. These shortcomings (among others) 
allowed Trump to argue for temporary absolute immunity, despite 200 
years of contrary precedent. While President Trump ultimately lost 
each legal battle, he won a war Nixon and Clinton never did: preventing 
evidence from being disclosed until his presidency was over. Trump 
even ran for reelection while the evidence remained blocked and the 
 
 175.  Id. at 124. 
 176.  See id. at 125. The panel in McGahn detailed the issues in McGrain v. Daugherty, 273 
U.S. 135, 174 (1927), which it distinguished because it “arose out of a habeas corpus suit filed after 
the Senate exercised its inherent contempt power to arrest the Attorney General’s brother.” 
McGahn, 973 F.3d at 125. It used a similar distinction to dismiss the citation of another case, 
Quinn v. United States, 349 U.S. 155, 160–61 (1955), which suggested Congress has “the authority 
to compel testimony” through “its own processes”—for the proposition that the “power of 
inquiry—with process to enforce it—is an essential and appropriate auxiliary to the legislative 
function.” McGahn, 973 F.3d at 125. 
 177.  Id. 
 178.  Id. 
 179.  Id. at 125–26 (emphasis added). 
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electorate uninformed about his possible criminal conduct. 
Chief Justice Roberts’ struggle with President Trump’s theory of 
presidential immunity was rooted in the fact that its contours “would 
seem to go much farther than resisting the subpoena.”180 Roberts 
expressed skepticism about the logic of President Trump’s propositions: 
“I don’t know why you don’t resist the investigation in its entirety or 
why your theory wouldn’t lead to that.”181 Trump’s attorney dodged,182 
but Roberts was nudging Trump’s attorneys to state their position: They 
objected to any and all investigations of a sitting president. It is this 
position that, more than anything, transposed President Trump’s 
political approach onto his legal one. His lawyers contorted to make 
arguments that flew in the face of Nixon and Jones and countless other 
cases in order to appease a client who, like a king, would not accept any 
authority other than his own. 
III. PREVENTING FUTURE TRUMPS 
The common refrain against impeachment is that the proper means 
of removing a president is an election. Setting aside the merits of that 
position, it nevertheless relies on an assumption that voters will have 
adequate information to make a sound judgment about the president’s 
performance, character, and abilities. When the president withholds 
critical information from the public, he gravely inhibits the electorate’s 
power to hold him accountable through the traditional political process. 
In short, President Trump’s tactics exposed major flaws in the system. 
Three reforms could resolve some of these problems. First, 
Congress should amend Special Counsel regulations to create a direct 
channel between a Special Counsel investigating the president and 
Congress or the public to avoid confusion and subsequent subpoenas 
arising from multiple corners of the government. Second, Congress 
should modify the deference that a president receives in federal court 
by creating a cause of action for presidents to pursue when appearing 
in their personal capacity to oppose subpoenas. It was abundantly clear 
that many of President Trump’s arguments would fail, yet broad 
deference to his claims afforded by way of his office permitted him to 
delay investigations into his conduct with expansive and unsupported 
 
 180.  Transcript of Oral Argument at 7, Trump v. Vance, 140 S. Ct. 2412 (2020) (No. 19-635). 
 181.  Id. 
 182.  See id. (“Well, our – our position is that criminal process against the President – and 
that’s what we’re talking about, that’s what’s before the Court – criminal process targeting the 
President is a violation of the Constitution.”). 
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arguments. Third, Congress should pass new laws to govern its authority 
to investigate presidents and Executive Branch officials, a power 
federal courts have already recognized Congress possesses with respect 
to subpoenas. The status-quo, which allowed President Trump to 
disable investigation after investigation, failed in that it neither 
provided effective oversight nor served the interest of keeping the 
public informed. The United States needs better law for presidential 
investigations. 
A.  Fixing the Special Counsel Regulations 
Public frustration over Special Counsel Mueller’s investigation cut 
in both ideological directions. Republicans complained that Mueller 
pursued too many of President Trump’s associates on charges unrelated 
to a conspiracy with Russia to interfere in the 2016 election. Democrats 
alleged that Mueller left many Trump-Russia stones unturned by failing 
to investigate Trump’s finances and alleged misconduct by Trump’s 
family members.183 The media criticized Mueller as well. Indeed, the 
New York Times hypothesized that Mueller was fearful he might 
“endanger [his] own image by expressing a forthright view of [Trump’s 
conduct], even if the future of the Republic might be at stake.”184 
Since Watergate, there have been two modes of special inquiry into 
presidential misconduct—both of which have elicited criticism.185 The 
first kind of inquiry is performed by an Independent Counsel, like Ken 
Starr, who operates outside the Executive Branch and answers to the 
judiciary and Congress.186 The second kind is a Special Counsel, like 
Mueller. Special Counsels work under a regulatory scheme meant to 
secure a level of independence, but because they answer to the 
Attorney General, they effectively remain under the control of the 
president.187 Special Counsels report their findings only to the Attorney 
General and no one else.188 There is no provision in the regulations for 
direct communications to the public or Congress—except for 
 
 183.  See Bob Bauer, It’s Time to Reform the Special-Counsel Rules—Again, THE ATLANTIC 
(June 1, 2019), https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2019/06/mueller-and-comey-were-very-
different-special-counsels/590836/ (critiquing Muller’s investigation as a “confusing, half-in and 
half-out analysis of possible obstruction of justice”). 
 184.  The Editorial Board, Decoding Robert Mueller, N.Y. TIMES (May 29, 2019), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/05/29/opinion/robert-mueller-trump.html.  
 185.  Bauer, supra note 183 and accompanying text. 
 186.  Id. 
 187.  Id. 
 188.  28 CFR § 600.8 (limiting communications by the Special Counsel to solely the Attorney 
General).  
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communications made by the Attorney General.189 
Both types of Counsel have been met with harsh criticism. The 
Independent Counsel statute, which was passed in the wake of Nixon’s 
firing of the Attorney General, Deputy Attorney General, and Special 
Counsel Archibald Cox,190 provided a broad mandate for a panel of 
judges from the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals to appoint a special 
prosecutor if the Attorney General deemed it necessary.191 In 1998, 
Justice Scalia excoriated the law as unconstitutional in his dissenting 
opinion in Morrison v. Olson.192 Scalia believed the independent 
counsel statute should be struck down because criminal prosecution is 
an exercise of “purely executive power” to be exclusively controlled by 
the president—not any other branch of government.193 The 
Independent Counsel statute also elicited political critiques: The 
Clinton investigation cost $40 million and polled poorly among the 
American public.194 Ultimately Congress permitted the independent 
counsel law to expire on June 30, 1999.195 
Separate from the Independent Counsel statute are the Special 
Counsel regulations, which the Department of Justice adopted just 
after the Independent Counsel statute had expired.196 The regulations 
require an appointment of a non-government person in sensitive cases, 
and only the Attorney General can dismiss the Special Counsel.197 
Additionally, the Special Counsel can only be dismissed “for cause”: 
misconduct, dereliction of duty, or other good cause.198 Political reasons 
 
 189.  28 CFR § 600.9 (providing for communications to Congress by the Attorney General 
about Special Counsel investigations). 
 190.  Ethics in Government Act of 1978, Pub. L. 94-521, 92 Stat. 1824 (1978). As the 
Watergate investigation ramped up, Archibald Cox prepared to issue subpoenas to President 
Nixon for Oval Office tapes. Nixon ordered his Attorney General to fire Cox. The Attorney 
General resigned. Nixon then ordered his Deputy Attorney General to fire Cox, and instead, he 
resigned. Solicitor General Robert Bork eventually carried out the order. Carroll Kilpatrick, 
Nixon Forces Firing of Cox; Richardson, Ruckelshaus Quit, WASH. POST, Oct. 21, 1973 at A01. 
 191.  Id. 
 192.  See 487 U.S. 654, 699 (1998) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (noting that while “issues of this sort” 
sometimes come before the court “clad in sheep’s clothing . . . this wolf comes as a wolf”). 
 193.  Id. at 734. 
 194.  Independent Probes of Clinton Administration cost nearly $80 million, CNN (Apr. 1, 
1999), https://edition.cnn.com/ALLPOLITICS/stories/1999/04/01/counsel.probe.costs/.  
 195.  Jim Mokhiber, A Brief History of the Independent Counsel Law, PBS (May 1998), 
https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/counsel/office/history.html.  
 196.  28 CFR § 600 (2020). 
 197.  28 CFR § 600.7(d). However, the recent Special Counsel appointment of U.S. Attorney 
for Connecticut John Durham to investigate the origins of the Mueller Investigation did not 
comply with this provision, raising questions about what the phrase “outside the government” 
means. 
 198.  Id. 
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alone would not carry the day.199 Although these protections would 
appear to shield any Special Counsel from political interference, 
Mueller’s top deputy stated that Mueller had resisted investigating 
President Trump’s finances for fear of being fired.200 While the Special 
Counsel regulations make clear that removal can only be for cause and 
issued by the Attorney General, the regulations are not statutory law 
and President Trump could have conceivably ordered the Attorney 
General to rescind them, and then fired Mueller.201 Trump could also 
simply have found a contrived reason to fire Mueller for cause, or 
circumvented the Justice Department regulations on the grounds that 
they do not apply to him, fired Mueller, and triggered a legal battle over 
his authority to go around them after Mueller was gone.202 The Special 
Counsel’s office was acutely aware of these potential outcomes, and 
Mueller’s deputy highlighted that “[w]e still do not know if there are 
other financial ties between the president and either the Russian 
government or Russian oligarchs” as a result of the fears that the 
investigation would be terminated prematurely.203 
According to Mueller’s deputy, Special Counsels face a number of 
obstacles when investigating a president: namely, the pardon power, the 
Attorney General’s control over the appointment, and the fact that 
every person has constitutional rights to respond to charges of 
criminality in court, which presidents cannot do because current Justice 
Department policy prohibits them from being indicted.204 The deputy’s 
 
 199.  Id. 
 200.  During the Special Counsel probe, former federal prosecutor Andrew Weissman was 
hired by Mueller to serve as his deputy for the prosecution of Trump’s campaign chair, Paul 
Manafort. According to Weissman, early in the investigation shortly after the discovery of a June 
2016 meeting between President Trump’s son, son-in-law, and campaign manager and Russians 
inside Trump Tower, the team was informed they Mueller would be fired the following day. While 
the firing never came to fruition, the team was warned several times in 2017 that Trump was 
preparing to fire Mueller. Weissman says Mueller, as a result of the threats, came to believe the 
investigation should be narrowly focused on Russian election interference operations and seen 
through to its conclusion, even if it meant backing away from other important questions and 
ultimately leaving them unanswered. ANDREW WEISSMAN, WHERE THE LAW ENDS: INSIDE THE 
MUELLER INVESTIGATION 112–17 (2020). 
 201.  Matthew Nussbaum, Can Trump fire Mueller? Yup, and in more ways than one, 
POLITICO (Jun. 13, 2017 3:19 PM), https://www.politico.com/story/2017/06/13/can-trump-fire-
special-counsel-robert-mueller-239500.  
 202.  It was reported that Trump claimed conflicts of interest over a fee dispute regarding 
Mueller’s membership at a Trump golf club to White House lawyers in an early attempt to oust 
Mueller from his position. Josh Gerstein, DOJ releases part of Mueller’s conflict of interest waiver, 
POLITICO (Sept. 14, 2019 11:13 AM), https://www.politico.com/story/2019/09/14/justice-dept-
mueller-conflict-of-interest-1496171.  
 203.  Id. 
 204.  See id. (noting that a current Department of Justice opinion states that a sitting president 
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warnings proved prescient. President Trump pardoned Michael Flynn, 
Paul Manafort, Roger Stone, and George Papadopoulos—each of 
whom was charged or convicted, or who pleaded guilty in the 
investigation.205 Despite Mueller concluding that, in four instances, 
President Trump’s conduct met all elements of the crime of obstruction 
of justice, Attorney General Bill Barr, who introduced the conclusions 
of the report to the public, said that Mueller “did not reach a conclusion 
on whether Trump obstructed justice” and that he and Deputy 
Attorney General Rosenstein independently concluded that Trump 
had not.206 Mueller told Attorney General Barr that he had distorted 
his team’s conclusions with his public statements.207 But during 
testimony to Congress, Mueller remained reticent to conclude 
President Trump committed a crime—lending credence to the idea that 
Special Counsels struggle with the policy that presidents cannot be 
indicted in a court of law.208 
More effective and formal communication between independent or 
special investigators and the public is warranted, and Congress or the 
Department of Justice should provide for this in existing regulations. 
Even though Mueller’s investigation did not generate the 
constitutional showdown that other Trump-related probes did, it is 
critical to keep in mind that subpoenas by Congress and a state 
prosecutor’s office were necessary for two primary reasons. First, there 
was widespread confusion about what exactly Mueller was 
investigating. And second, Mueller was hesitant to pursue Trump’s 
 
cannot be indicted). 
 205.  Pardons Granted by President Donald Trump, DEP’T OF JUSTICE (Jan. 29, 2021), 
https://www.justice.gov/pardon/pardons-granted-president-donald-trump.  
 206.  Attorney General William P. Barr Delivers Remarks on the Release of the Report on the 
Investigation Into Russian Interference in the 2016 Presidential Election, DEP’T OF JUSTICE (Apr. 
18, 2019), https://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/attorney-general-william-p-barr-delivers-remarks-
release-report-investigation-russian. 
 207.  After the submission of Report of the Special Counsel on the Investigation into Russian 
Interference in the 2016 Presidential Election and Obstruction of Justice, Attorney General Barr 
held a press conference and sent a letter to Congress claiming the investigation did not establish 
criminal wrongdoing by President Trump. Robert Mueller then wrote a letter to Attorney 
General Barr stating his remarks “did not fully capture the context, nature, and substance of this 
Office’s work and conclusions.” Letter to the Honorable William Barr, Re: Report of the Special 
Counsel on the Investigation into Russian Interference in the 2016 Presidential Election and 
Obstruction of Justice, DEP’T OF JUSTICE (Mar. 27, 2019), 
https://www.npr.org/2019/04/30/718883130/mueller-complained-that-barr-summary-of-trump-
russia-probe-lacked-context. 
 208.  See discussion supra note 204 and accompanying text (noting that Department of Justice 
regulations prohibit the indictment of a sitting president, preventing Special Counsels from 
accusing them of crimes because they cannot give presidents the chance to confront the charges 
in court). 
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financial information largely because of Trump’s influence over 
Mueller’s own appointment. Had Mueller been required to submit 
updates or discuss the investigation publicly in testimony to Congress 
or brief announcements through the Justice Department, then the 
public would have had a greater understanding of the investigation, and 
Congress and other prosecutors might have known to pursue financial 
leads sooner. Investigations of presidents are, at least in some part, 
about ensuring that voters have enough information to make an 
informed decision about whether a president deserves their political 
support. Some critics might argue that a public-facing Special Counsel 
would create a circus like the Clinton Independent Counsel had,209 but 
there is a reasonable middle ground between Mueller’s total silence 
and Starr’s numerous press conferences. 
Special Counsel testimony to a Congressional committee in three-
month intervals would help ensure that a Special Counsel’s work is not 
being curtailed by the president or, if it is, that any obstructive behavior 
is presented to voters. Testimony should focus on the broad contours of 
the status of an investigation and answering questions about whether 
certain steps will or will not be pursued, subject to sensitivity 
protections regarding ongoing criminal proceedings. If the public, 
Congress, or the Manhattan D.A. had known earlier that Mueller 
concluded Trump had obstructed justice, or that the Special Counsel 
team was not pursuing financial leads, or that Mueller intended to 
abide by Justice Department policy not to indict a sitting president, the 
investigations of the Trump era might have been remarkably more 
efficient. 
B.  Reforming Presidential Deference in Federal Courts 
Next is the issue of President Trump’s constitutional claims. Trump 
did not just take advantage of Supreme Court deference to the 
Executive Branch in subpoena cases, he abused it. His convoluted 
arguments alleging absolute immunity from state grand jury subpoenas 
or claiming that he was entitled to a heightened standard for any 
subpoena involving him contradicted the holdings of both Nixon and 
Jones. Courts did not expedite hearings like they did for Nixon’s 
appeals. And Trump’s failures to file straightforward claims caused 
 
 209.  Joe Concha, Joe Lockhart praises Mueller, while slamming Starr for holding press 
conferences, THE HILL (Mar. 8, 2019 11:40 AM), https://thehill.com/homenews/media/433220-joe-
lockhart-praises-mueller-while-slamming-starr-for-holding-press.  
DENAULT_03_11_21_FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 3/14/2021  4:26 PM 
178 DUKE JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW & PUBLIC POLICY SIDEBAR [VOL. 16 
(and continue to cause) judicial confusion.210 
President Trump’s argument in Vance that he was absolutely 
immune from criminal process rested on shaky ground from the outset. 
The Vance decision reads as a recitation of Nixon and Jones, primarily 
because Trump’s arguments had effectively ignored both cases: In 
Vance, the Court concluded that “Article II and the Supremacy Clause 
do not categorically preclude, or require a heightened standard, for the 
issuance of a state criminal subpoena to a sitting President.”211 One new 
element the Court could have considered worthy of analysis in Vance 
might have been whether state prosecutors—but not federal ones—
were precluded from investigating a president on federalism grounds. 
Recall that in Jones, the Supreme Court noted that it would not address 
whether a president should be amenable to legal process in state court, 
which would raise questions about federalism, local prejudice and 
comity concerns.212 And, to his credit, President Trump did raise some 
political arguments questioning the wisdom of allowing local 
prosecutors across the country—often elected themselves—to pursue 
criminal investigations of a sitting president.213 But most of Trump’s 
arguments could be logically applied to both federal and state 
prosecutors, suggesting acceptance of his argument would require at 
least some reversal of Nixon.214 Moreover, Vance did not spend much 
time addressing federalism or local prejudice, since the core of Trump’s 
claim was not that state prosecutors are uniquely unsuited to 
investigate a president but rather that compulsory criminal process to 
the sitting President crosses a constitutional line when it is not 
accompanied by a promise not to indict him.215 The logical extension of 
Trump’s arguments to federal investigations raises questions about why 
the Supreme Court allowed Trump to recycle rejected presidential 
claims. 
The Court’s final pronouncement in Vance clearly reaffirmed 
 
 210.  President Trump filed subsequent constitutional claims over the subpoenas by the 
Manhattan D.A. instead of filing a straightforward motion to quash. See discussion supra notes 
150–165 and accompanying text. 
 211.  Trump v. Vance, 140 S. Ct. 2412, 2416 (2020). 
 212.  Clinton v. Jones, 520 U.S. 681, 704 (1997). 
 213.  Trump argued that States and localities often “disagree with choices made by the 
President,” like decisions about deploying federal resources, and that the prospect of states and 
localities registering that disagreement through investigations could inhibit the president from 
fully performing his presidential duties. Reply Brief for Petitioner, Trump v. Vance, 140 S. Ct. 
2412 at 10 (No. 19-3204). 
 214.  See discussion supra notes 132–135 and accompanying text.  
 215.  Brief for Petitioner, Trump v. Vance, 140 S. Ct. 2412 (2020) (No. 19-3204) at 9. 
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Nixon: “[N]o citizen, not even the President, is categorically above the 
common duty to produce evidence when called upon in a criminal 
proceeding.”216 Chief Justice Roberts, the author of the majority 
opinion, relied on “two hundred years” of support for that 
conclusion.217 President Trump’s hodgepodge of inconsistent 
arguments—many of which contradicted centuries of precedent—
should not have warranted deference presidents typically receive in 
federal court. Courts also permitted Trump to advocate for a 
heightened standard for presidential subpoenas, something that Nixon 
almost explicitly foreclosed.218 Remember, too, that President Nixon 
moved to quash the subpoena issued for his Oval Office tapes219; 
something which Trump has still not done to date. Instead of presenting 
arguments courts typically assess, Trump raised a blanket claim of 
presidential immunity similar to the one rejected in Jones, based on 
arguments similar to the ones rejected in that case. 
Courts bear some responsibility for allowing Trump to delay 
proceedings without filing straightforward claims. Recall that the Nixon 
Court fast-tracked President Nixon’s attempt to quash the subpoena 
for his Oval Office tapes past the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals and 
straight to the Supreme Court in recognition of “the public importance 
of the issues presented and the need for their prompt resolution.”220 
The Vance Court made no similar decision. Instead, it slow-walked 
President Trump’s attempt to block criminal investigations into his 
conduct. In fact, the Supreme Court delayed hearing the case: Oral 
argument was originally scheduled for March 2020 but was delayed two 
months because of the COVID-19 pandemic.221 While this was an 
understandable delay, the case was still only heard after six others 
presented before it.222 Further delay after the Supreme Court’s decision 
in Vance when the case was remanded presents questions, too: after the 
Second Circuit’s second rejection of Trump’s request to block the grand 
jury subpoena using the unusual § 1983 claim, Trump’s emergency 
petition to the Supreme Court for a stay pending appeal of that 
 
 216.  Id. at 2431. 
 217.  Id. 
 218.  See discussion supra Part II.A. 
 219.  United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 686 (1974). 
 220.  Id. at 686–87. 
 221.  Devin Dwyer, Coronavirus Forces Supreme Court to Delay Cases to Protect Health of 
Justices, Attorneys, ABC NEWS (Mar. 16, 2020), https://abcnews.go.com/Politics/coronavirus-
forces-supreme-court-delay-cases-protect-health/story?id=69620103.  
 222.  Calendar of Events May 2020, SCOTUSBLOG, 
https://www.scotusblog.com/events/2020-05/ (last accessed Feb. 22, 2021).  
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decision sat for four months before it was denied without hearing.223 It 
is unclear why the current Supreme Court waited so long and did not 
view the ongoing criminal investigation into President Trump with the 
same urgency that a previous Court had viewed the indictment and trial 
of President Nixon’s associates. But reason cautions against courts 
selectively weighing the public import of a criminal investigations 
involving a president because it would invite judges to make what could 
fairly be characterized as a political decision. 
The Supreme Court also had opportunities to ask Trump to present 
claims rooted in existing law and could have demanded that Trump file 
a motion to quash to accompany his claim of absolute immunity.224 The 
Court could have asked the parties to address supplemental issues that 
would remain at stake in Vance in the event Trump’s arguments for 
absolute immunity had failed. In fact, the Court took care to issue a 
supplemental question before the oral argument in Vance at the request 
of Justice Kavanaugh, who wanted to know whether the political 
question doctrine prohibited the case from adjudication in federal 
courts.225 Instead of demanding that Trump make legal arguments 
supported by existing law, the Court left these legitimate claims 
unaddressed for more than a year.226 Trump’s novel claim—made in his 
private capacity—received too much deference in federal court. 
Congress and courts can and should adjust deference given to 
presidents appearing in their private capacity and making claims not 
rooted in existing law to block subpoenas. Courts should not end all 
deference to presidents appearing in their private capacity. Even in his 
position as a private citizen, the president deserves additional legal 
rights as the occupant of one of the most demanding offices in the 
country. But deference to the president and deference to unsupported 
legal theories are two entirely different principles. 
Three possible changes, which could be made through a 
Congressional statute creating a cause of action for presidents to 
challenge subpoenas in federal court, would foster more efficient and 
 
 223.  Adam Liptak, Supreme Court Denies Trump’s Final Bid to Block Release of Financial 
Records, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 22, 2021 11:11 AM), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/02/22/us/supreme-
court-trump-taxes-financial-records.html.  
 224.  Trump v. Vance, 140 S. Ct. 2412, 2431 (2020). 
 225.  Amy Howe, Justices Ask For More Briefing in Trump Tax-Returns Cases, 
SCOTUSBLOG (Apr. 27, 2020), https://www.scotusblog.com/2020/04/justices-ask-for-more-
briefing-in-trump-tax-returns-cases/.  
 226.  Trump v. Vance, No. 19 Civ. 8694, slip op. at 103 (2020) (emphasis added). 
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legally sound proceedings in this arena.227 First, the statute could 
mandate a higher level of scrutiny for any presidential lawsuit to block 
a lawful subpoena made in a president’s private capacity that does not 
state an existing doctrine of law, like a privilege, as its basis. Second, the 
statute could mandate that any case involving criminal grand jury 
subpoenas relating to a president should be considered a matter of 
public import and expedited through the appellate process. Third, 
where a president lodges a constitutional claim not currently 
recognized by law, courts could require the parties to address additional 
claims that will likely arise later in the proceeding, like overbreadth or 
bad faith. Since the constitutional question of whether a sitting 
president can be subject to subpoena by federal and state grand juries 
and Congress has been squarely answered in the affirmative, a new 
statute regulating proceedings on this issue should withstand 
constitutional muster as long as it does not violate any president’s 
constitutional rights.228 
These changes might invite criticism that the courts would be 
dragged too readily into political investigations or that Congress risks 
a dramatic increase in investigation of sitting presidents. But they 
would also foster expeditious oversight of the head of the Executive 
Branch and avoid re-litigation of these issues every two decades. And 
judges can usually separate the goats from the sheep: If investigators 
begin harassing presidents, judges can toss subpoenas out or Congress 
could amend the law. Congress is not powerless to remedy the problems 
President Trump exposed in fighting presidential subpoenas—and 
should further codify its power as discussed in the next section. 
 
 227.  The constitutionality of such a law would surely be subject to debate, much of which 
would depend on its language. However, a number of cases suggest that if Congress passed a law 
regulating procedure of federal claims made by presidents in their personal capacity to block 
subpoenas, it would fall within its constitutional authority to regulate Article III courts. See, e.g., 
Miller v. French, 530 U.S. 327 (2000) (holding that Congress can validly amend constitutional law 
with a regulation on remedies as long as it does not violate a constitutional rule); United States v. 
Klein, 80 U.S. 128 (1872) (holding that Congress is only prohibited from commanding 
unconstitutional outcomes when regulating Article III cases); Pennsylvania v. Wheeling & 
Belmont Bridge Co., 50 U.S. 647 (1850) (holding that where Congress passes a constitutional 
statute which falls within the ambit of its authority, the statute’s consequences are permitted to 
be inconsistent with previous federal law as long as they do not violate constitutional law). There 
is even a viable argument that by creating a cause of action for a president to seek immediate 
judicial review of any subpoena—but, of course, imposing no heightened standards on such 
review—the law would actually benefit presidents, not harm them. Whether creating a specific 
cause of action for presidents itself inherently imposes a heightened standard presents a thornier 
question for another paper. 
 228.  Miller v. French, 530 U.S. 327 (2000) (holding that Congress can validly amend 
constitutional law with regulation as long as it honors constitutional rules). 
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C.  Creating a Congressional Statute for Presidential Subpoenas 
One truth the Trump presidency revealed is that Americans are 
wary of impeachment.229 Yet impeachment remains the primary 
mechanism to exercise oversight of the president. During the Supreme 
Court’s recitation of historical evidence in Jones, it pointed to remarks 
by James Wilson, delegate to the Constitutional Convention in 
Philadelphia, who stated that the president, “far from being above the 
laws,” is “amenable to them in his private character as a citizen, and in 
his public character by impeachment.”230 With the decisions of Mazars 
and McGahn affirming that Congress has a constitutional subpoena 
power and the standing to pursue it in federal court when it legislates 
rules for doing so, Congress should codify the House of 
Representatives’ subpoena powers against the president into federal 
law. 
What would such a statute look like? Look no further than Trump 
v. Mazars.231 In Mazars, although the Court explicitly rejected 
President Trump’s demand for a heightened standard to restrict 
Congressional subpoenas for presidential evidence,232 it set forth a four-
part test for courts to use when evaluating the lawfulness of a 
Congressional subpoena to a president. That test offers guidance for a 
new House subpoena statute. First, the law should require any 
subpoena to be accompanied by a legislative purpose that warrants the 
significant step of involving the president and his evidence.233 Second, 
the law should demand that a House committee tailors the subpoena 
so it is no broader than necessary—the more specific, the better.234 
Third, the law should require detailed and substantial evidence in 
support of whatever legislative purpose is cited in justification for the 
subpoena.235 Fourth, the law should mandate that each subpoena 
include a careful assessment of the burdens imposed on the president 
 
 229.  See discussion infra note 241 and accompanying text (discussing polling which showed 
that Americans were evenly divided on the issue of impeachment regardless of evidence 
presented). 
 230.  Clinton v. Jones, 520 U.S. 681, 696 (1997). 
 231.  See Trump v. Mazars USA, LLP, 140 S. Ct. 2019, 2036 (2020) (creating a four-part test 
for the enforcement of congressional subpoenas for information relating to the private papers of 
the president). 
 232.  Id. at 2032 (holding that the request the House establish a “demonstrated, specific need” 
for information or show that it is “critical” to its purpose would “seriously risk impeding Congress 
in carrying out its responsibilities”).  
 233.  Id. at 2035. 
 234.  Id. at 2036. 
 235.  Id.  
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by the subpoena and an explanation for why there are no less invasive 
means of obtaining the information.236 
The law could follow the lead of similar statutes and include 
exemptions and exceptions mentioned in the McGahn case: other 
compulsory statutes exempt persons testifying on matters of 
governmental privilege;237 previous statutes created a limited form of 
immunity for individuals about facts they were compelled to testify 
upon to Congress.238 The new statute should also create an enforcement 
mechanism for subpoenas issued by any House Committee as discussed 
by the D.C. Circuit in McGahn.239 No matter what the final result looks 
like, it is evident from Mazars and McGahn that federal courts would 
accept a statute codifying the House’s ability to subpoena the president 
or Executive Branch officials and an accompanying cause of action to 
enforce subpoenas for presidential papers, White House testimony, and 
Executive Branch evidence. 
When President Trump was impeached on charges of abuse of 
power and obstruction of Congress just six months after Mueller 
testified publicly,240 Americans were divided on the question of whether 
Trump should be impeached and removed from office.241 Intriguingly, 
more Americans approved of impeachment charges than approved his 
conviction and removal on those same charges.242 This distinction 
suggests Americans are less wary of the House of Representatives 
investigating presidential wrongdoing than they are of the Senate 
removing the president from office. Yet the House was unable to 
compel testimony from a number of individuals—including McGahn—
 
 236.  Id. 
 237.  28 U.S.C. § 1365(a) (2018). 
 238.  See, e.g., In re Chapman, 166 U.S. 661, 665 n.1 (1897) (holding that “[n]o person 
examined and testifying before either house of congress, or any committee of either house, shall 
be held to answer criminally in any court of justice”). 
 239.  U.S. H.R. v. McGahn, 973 F.3d 121, 126 (D.C. Cir. 2020). 
 240.  Articles of Impeachment Against Donald John Trump, H. R. Res. 755, 116th Cong. 
(2019). 
 241.  Gallup, one of the most reputable polling institutions in the United States, found that 46 
percent of Americans favored Trump’s conviction and removal, compared to 33 percent who 
favored President Clinton’s conviction and removal in 1999. Frank Newport, Impeachment from 
the American Public’s Perspective, GALLUP (Jan. 24, 2020), 
https://news.gallup.com/opinion/polling-matters/284030/impeachment-american-public-
perspective.aspx. The same poll demonstrated that American opinions on impeachment of 
President Trump largely tracked their approval or disapproval of his job performance. However, 
it also found that deviation was higher among those who disapproved of Trump’s job performance 
as president than those who approved, indicating there is a higher bar for conviction and removal 
of a president than his acquittal. Id.  
 242.  Id. 
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in its impeachment proceeding, and critical evidence pertinent to 
Trump’s guilt or innocence went unheard.243 
The House should remedy problems that enabled its own 
shortcomings in Executive Branch oversight. It is notable that the D.C. 
Circuit again vacated the second judgment denying the House’s 
petition to enforce the subpoena in McGahn and scheduled another en 
banc rehearing. This suggests that the full court of appeals may not 
agree with the panel’s conclusion that the House must pass a law 
creating a cause of action to enforce subpoenas in federal court.244 
Regardless of whether it overrules the conclusion that a statutory cause 
of action is required, the House should address the problems with 
presidential subpoenas anyway. While Americans may view 
impeachment as divisive, instances of presidential misconduct are not 
going to decrease in the modern era where electronic communication 
and advancements in technology have created a wider array of 
evidence for investigators. Instead of resisting these changes, the 
House—and, where appropriate, the Senate—would do well to 
confront this issue head on and adjust Congress’s system of presidential 
oversight accordingly. 
CONCLUSION 
President Nixon said, “I welcome this kind of examination because 
people have got to know whether or not their president’s a crook. Well, 
I’m not a crook.”245 He publicly welcomed investigations, even if he 
resisted them privately, in the hopes of being seen as a politician 
beyond reproach.246 Implicit in the historic dance between presidents 
and their investigators is the tension between resistance and 
cooperation. Two poles—a president’s desire to avoid implication of 
wrongdoing on one end and the public’s interest in obtaining 
information about a president’s conduct on the other—demand 
 
 243.  Spencer Hsu and Anne Marminow, Former White House Counsel Don McGahn does 




 244.  Comm. on the Judiciary of the U.S. H.R. v. McGahn, No. 19-5331, 2020 U.S. App. 
LEXIS 32573, at *6 (D.C. Cir. Oct. 15, 2020). 
 245.  Cokie Roberts & Steve Inskeep, A History of Presidential Tax Returns, NPR: MORNING 
EDITION (Feb. 15, 2019), https://www.npr.org/2019/02/15/695054845/a-history-of-presidential-
tax-returns. 
 246.  See id. (noting that President Nixon’s tax returns were in fact leaked by someone at the 
IRS, leading to his insistence that he was not a crook). 
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compromise between powerful forces in a decentralized government. 
But President Trump did not accept this reality. From the outset, Trump 
denounced any investigation into his conduct as a witch hunt, openly 
obstructed investigators, and resisted authority at every turn.247 His 
conduct betrayed the notion that a president would always want to be 
viewed as cooperative and truthful, the foundation of compromise 
between presidents and investigators. 
President Trump should not be faulted for fighting investigations 
into his conduct in federal court, since many presidents in history have 
pushed back against investigators. But other presidents accepted the 
letter and the logic of the law. They did not employ roundabout ways 
of contesting precedent on presidential investigations. By doing both, 
Trump challenged the very principles of oversight that underpin the 
constitutional system. His use of arguments that exceeded the scope of 
his claims, ignorance of the logical application of Nixon and Jones, 
avoidance of arguments rooted in existing law, and rejection of States 
and Congress as separate branches of government present separate but 
equally dangerous approaches that future presidents could build upon. 
If no adjustments are made, successful delays of the transmission of 
presidential evidence will continue, and courts will be left reminding 
presidents that they are not kings248 as they review new iterations of the 
same recycled arguments again and again. 
During President Trump’s tenure, multiple judges came to the 
conclusion that the president is not a king, implicitly or explicitly.249 It 
is true that in some cases, Trump’s lawsuits presented novel questions 
of law, like Mazars which raised the issue of whether Congress could 
pursue a presidential investigation absent an impeachment inquiry (it 
 
 247.  Cheyenne Haslett and Jordyn Phelps, Trump attacks Mueller for continuing ‘Phony 
Witch Hunt’ day after Manafort accused of lying, ABC NEWS (Nov. 27, 2018 3:22 PM), 
https://abcnews.go.com/Politics/trump-attacks-mueller-day-manafort-accused-
lying/story?id=59439963; Erin Durkin, Trump attacks ‘disgraced’ Mueller and rails against ‘phony’ 
obstruction claims, THE GUARDIAN (Aug. 20, 2018 10:40 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/us-
news/2018/aug/20/trump-mueller-obstruction-russia-investigation-phony.  
 248.  See McGahn, supra at note 6, at 213 (pointing out that the “primary takeaway from the 
past 250 years of recorded American history is that Presidents are not kings” in response to 
President Trump’s argument that courts had no authority to enforce House subpoenas). 
 249.  See, e.g., Trump v. Mazars, 140 S. Ct. 2019, 2035 (2020) (rejecting Trump’s claim that 
presidents were immune from Congressional oversight absent an impeachment inquiry); Trump 
v. Vance, 140 S. Ct. 2412, 2431 (2020) (rejecting Trump’s claim that presidents were totally 
immune from state grand jury subpoenas); Comm. on the Judiciary v. McGahn, 415 F. Supp. 3d 
148, 213 (D.D.C. 2019) (rejecting Trump’s claim that courts cannot enforce Congressional 
subpoenas by pointing out that presidents are not kings). 
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could).250 And the Court did create a new avenue for presidents to 
challenge Congressional subpoenas.251 But the Vance case offered no 
similar major development in presidential investigations law; rather, it 
reads as a recitation of Nixon and Jones. That is because it was 
abundantly clear that there is no total immunity for a sitting president 
from a grand jury subpoena. The Court’s final words in Vance are little 
more than a time warp to Nixon: “[N]o citizen, not even the President, 
is categorically above the common duty to produce evidence when 
called upon in a criminal proceeding.”252 For the country to survive 
another decade, let alone another 243 years, no president should be 
permitted to disrupt oversight so expansively again by employing 
political and legal claims that ignore this logic and precedent. 
Preventing such abuse requires improved Special Counsel regulations, 
less deference to presidents appearing in their personal capacity, and a 
statutory scheme that guides Congressional subpoenas to presidents. 
These solutions offer clear remedies to presidential abuse of the legal 
system without jeopardizing the American constitutional framework, 
and they present a pathway back toward holding the president 
accountable—if we ever did. 
 
 
 250.  Mazars, 140 S. Ct. at 2035. 
 251.  See id. at 2035–36 (holding that courts should first “carefully assess whether the asserted 
legislative purpose warrants the significant step of involving the President,” then “insist on a 
subpoena no broader than reasonably necessary to support Congress’s legislative object,” then 
show attentiveness “to the nature of the evidence offered by Congress to establish that a subpoena 
advance a valid legislative purpose,” and finally “be careful to assess the burdens imposed on the 
President by a subpoena”). 
 252.  Vance, 140 S. Ct. at 2431. 
